



BTC

**MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
AND ANIMAL RESOURCES**



RESULTS REPORT 2014

INTERVENTION SUPPORT PROGRAM TO SPATII – MARKET ORIENTED ADVISORY SERVICES AND QUALITY SEEDS



Table of content

ACRONYMS	4
1 INTERVENTION AT A GLANCE	6
1.1 INTERVENTION FORM.....	6
1.2 BUDGET EXECUTION.....	7
1.3 SELF-ASSESSMENT SUMMARY.....	7
1.4 SELF-ASSESSMENT PERFORMANCE	8
1.4.1 <i>Relevance</i>	8
1.4.2 <i>Effectiveness</i>	8
1.4.3 <i>Efficiency</i>	9
1.4.4 <i>Potential sustainability</i>	10
1.5 CONCLUSIONS	11
2 RESULTS MONITORING.....	13
2.1 EVOLUTION OF THE CONTEXT	13
2.1.1 <i>General context</i>	13
2.1.2 <i>Institutional context</i>	13
2.1.3 <i>Management context: execution modalities</i>	13
2.1.4 <i>Harmo context</i>	13
2.2 PERFORMANCE OUTCOME: IMPROVED ACCESS TO ADVISORY SERVICES FOR CROPS AND LIVESTOCK AND ACCESS TO AND USE OF HIGH QUALITY PLANTING MATERIALS AND SEED, FOR MEN AND WOMEN	14
2.2.1 <i>Progress of indicators</i>	14
2.2.2 <i>Analysis of progress made</i>	15
2.2.3 <i>Potential Impact</i>	16
2.3 PERFORMANCE OUTPUT 1: SEED PRODUCTION CHAINS OF SPECIFIC GROUPS OF FOOD CROPS WITH A MARKET VALUE ARE PROFESSIONALIZED	17
2.3.1 <i>Progress of indicators</i>	17
2.3.2 <i>Progress of main activities</i>	19
2.3.3 <i>Analysis of progress made</i>	19
2.4 PERFORMANCE OUTPUT 2: INCREASED PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEED SECTOR	20
2.4.1 <i>Progress of indicators</i>	20
2.4.2 <i>Progress of main activities</i>	21
2.4.3 <i>Analysis of progress made</i>	21
2.5 PERFORMANCE OUTPUT 3: SUSTAINABLE MECHANISMS FOR DEMAND ARTICULATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF MARKET-ORIENTED ADVISORY SERVICES	22
2.5.1 <i>Progress of indicators</i>	22
2.5.2 <i>Progress of main activities</i>	23

2.5.3	<i>Analysis of progress made</i>	24
2.6	PERFORMANCE OUTPUT 4: PROXIMITY AGRICULTURAL ADVISORS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING RESPONSES TO THE DEMANDS OF FARMERS, LIVESTOCK KEEPERS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS.....	25
2.6.1	<i>Progress of indicators</i>	25
2.6.2	<i>Progress of main activities</i>	26
2.6.3	<i>Analysis of progress made</i>	26
2.7	PERFORMANCE OUTPUT 5: LESSONS LEARNED ON AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY SERVICES AND SEED DOCUMENTED AND USED IN POLICY AND DECISION MAKING.....	27
2.7.1	<i>Progress of indicators</i>	27
2.7.2	<i>Progress of main activities</i>	28
2.7.3	<i>Analysis of progress made</i>	28
2.8	TRANSVERSAL THEMES.....	29
2.8.1	<i>Gender</i>	29
2.8.2	<i>Environment</i>	29
2.8.3	<i>HIV</i>	29
2.9	RISK MANAGEMENT.....	30
3	STEERING AND LEARNING	36
3.1	STRATEGIC RE-ORIENTATIONS.....	36
3.2	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	36
3.3	LESSONS LEARNED.....	37
4	ANNEXES	38
4.1	QUALITY CRITERIA	38
4.2	DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND FOLLOW-UP	48
4.3	UPDATED LOGICAL FRAMEWORK.....	53
4.4	MORE RESULTS AT A GLANCE	53
4.5	“BUDGET VERSUS CURRENT (Y – M)” REPORT	53

Acronyms

BS	Basic seed
BTC	Belgian Development Agency
BXW	Banana Xanthomonas Wilt
CICA	Centre for Information and Communication in Agriculture
CMC	Community Mobilization Campaign
CS	Certified Seed
DELCO	Co-manager
DI	Director of Intervention
DTF	See TFF
EDPRS II	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II
FFS	Farmer Field School
ICM	Integrated Crop Management
ITA	International Technical Assistant
JLCB	Joint Local Consultative Body
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NA	Not available
NC	National Coordinator
NSL	National Seed Laboratory
PBS	Pre-basic seed
QDS	Quality Declared Seed
RAB	Rwanda Agricultural Board
RSE	Rwanda Seed Enterprise
SPAT II	Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation II
SPAT III	Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation III
SPIU	Single Project Implementation Unit
SSPAT II	Support to the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation II
TBD	To be deleted
TFF	Technical and financial file

ToT	Training of Trainers
BS	Basic seed
BTC	Belgian Development Agency
BXW	Banana Xanthomonas Wilt
CICA	Centre for Information and Communication in Agriculture
CMC	Community Mobilization Campaign
CS	Certified Seed

1 Intervention at a glance

1.1 Intervention form

Intervention title	Support to the SPAT-II: Market Oriented Advisory Services and Quality Seed
Intervention code	RWA 09 071 11
Location	Rwanda
Total budget	18,000,000 EURO
Partner Institution	MINAGRI - RAB
Start date Specific Agreement	6th of December 2010
Date intervention start /Opening steering committee	1st of July 2011
Planned end date of execution period	30th of June 2016
End date Specific Agreement	5th of December 2016
Target groups	Farmers, service providers, seed producers, RAB, CICA, MINAGRI
Impact	Agricultural outputs and incomes increased under sustainable production systems and for all groups of farmers, and food security ensured for all the population
Outcome	Improved access to advisory services for crops and livestock and access to and use of high quality planting materials and seed, for men and women
Outputs	1. Seed production chains of specific groups of food crops with a market value are professionalized (Seed)
	2. Increased private sector involvement in the seed sector (Seed)
	3. Sustainable mechanisms for demand articulation and responsiveness of market-oriented advisory services (FFS-Twigire)
	4. Proximity agricultural advisors capable of delivering responses to the demands of farmers, livestock keepers and their organizations (FFS-Twigire)
	5. Lessons learned on agricultural advisory services and seed documented and used in policy and decision making
Year covered by the report	2014

1.2 Budget execution

	Budget	Expenditure		Balance	Disbursement rate at the end of year 2014
		Previous years	Year covered by report (2014)		
Total	18,000,000	2013: 4,709,282 2012: 4,188,742 2011: 552,794	3,491,736	5,057,445	72%
Output 1	3,316,600	2013: 758,361 2012: 1,052,631 2011: 716	222,930	1,281,959	61%
Output 2	2,300,054	2013: 483,751 2012: 232,436 2011: 78,963	760,120	744,782	68%
Output 3	1,071,474	2013: 362,527 2012: 126,809 2011: 23,163	292,641	266,332	75%
Output 4	7,358,080	2013: 2,566,500 2012: 1,704,194 2011: 219,523	1,622,629	1,245,232	83%
Output 5	348,000	2013: 1,563 2012: 91,847 2011: 6,864	1,212	246,511	29%

1.3 Self-assessment summary

Considering the complexity of our program and that the components are at different stages of implementation and that their assessment differs from each other.

	Seed	FFS/Twigire	CICA
Relevance	C	A	A
Effectiveness	C	A	B
Efficiency	C	A	A
Potential Sustainability	D	D	B

1.4 Self-assessment performance

1.4.1 Relevance

	Performance
Relevance (Seed)	C
Relevance (FFS Twigire)	A
Relevance (CICA)	A

For Seed:

Although the intervention logic on itself still holds, it appears that it was never fully supported by the partner. The latest reform of RAB is not building on the important changes that were achieved in the intervention. This actually shows that there is no real plan to create a self-financing seed production system that responds to the demand of its clients. In other words, the intervention has tried to establish a structure for which there was never sufficient support from the partner. The assumption that Rwanda wanted such a system appears to be wrong.

For FFS Twigire:

This is clearly fully in line with national and Belgian policies on food security and it is adequate intervention logic.

For CICA:

This is clearly fully in line with national and Belgian policies

1.4.2 Effectiveness

	Performance
Effectiveness (Seed)	C
Effectiveness (FFS Twigire)	A
Effectiveness (CICA)	B

For Seed:

The management of the intervention (program management and Steering Committee) has tried to adapt the intervention to the changing environment and has several times tried to put the seed component back on track. In other words, the decision that had to be taken, were taken. Nevertheless, several important decisions of the steering committee were not implemented, particularly these which were to be implemented by RAB, outside the direct control of the intervention's management. One year before the end of the

intervention, it is clear that the expected outcome of increasing the access and use of high quality planting material will not be fully met, due to a malfunctioning seed system. Even though several activities of the program are implemented well and will most likely achieve results, they will not be able to substantially contribute to the achievement of the outcome.

For FFS Twigire:

The degree to which the intervention has increased the access to advisory services in Rwanda is exceptionally good. Thanks to the full integration of FFS in Twigire Muhinzi, practically all farmers in Rwanda have now access to improved extension services. The 2500 FFS facilitators of the intervention now train 15,000 Farmer promoters (1 per village – nation-wide) who on their turn work with all farmers in their village. Furthermore, every season, the FFS facilitators continue to reach 100,000 new farmers directly in new FFS groups. So all Rwandan farmers have access to a basic training through the farmer promoters and gradually more and more farmers can benefit from an in depth training in the FFS groups.

For CICA:

The outputs of CICA have clearly contributed to increasing the access to advisory services. Not only is a diverse range of quality extensional material produced, also the dissemination channels are addressed. Especially the brand new intuitive extension website has a high potential. An important aspect that still needs to be improved is the position of CICA within MINAGRI and the collaboration with MINAGRI agencies and projects.

1.4.3 Efficiency

	Performance
Efficiency (Seed)	C
Efficiency (FFS Twigire)	A
Efficiency (CICA)	A

For Seed:

As it can be seen from the assessment of the activities further in the report, we conclude that some activities are well on track, but that other financially heavy activities are seriously delayed to such extent that they will have to be cancelled. It is sad to see that the delayed activities are the activities for which the partner, RAB, took full responsibility.

For FFS Twigire:

Most activities are implemented on time and several outputs exceed the initial expectations. The delays encountered in some activities are still under control and the expected output will be achieved by the end of the intervention. The only aspect that will not be achieved is the direct payment for extension services by farmers, due to a (valid) change in orientation.

For CICA:

Most activities are implemented on time and quality outputs are delivered.

1.4.4 Potential sustainability

	Performance
Potential sustainability (Seed)	D
Potential sustainability (FFS Twigire)	D
Potential sustainability (CICA)	B

For Seed:

After the 2013 reform, the majority of the staff in the Seed Production Unit was assigned to the unit as an additional task to their 'normal' function, even though some of them would work 100% for the unit. This was the only possibility to get started because RAB itself could not change the contracts of the staff. With the latest reform, the Rwandan government had an opportunity to make the Seed Production Unit a permanent structure. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The Seed Unit in the new structure is not an independent unit in charge of seed production, seed processing, storing and selling pre-basic and basic seed.

For the training of the private seed growers, RAB and thus the intervention are counting too much on contracted staff financed by the intervention, who unfortunately have not been given new positions after the reform.

In quality control, all trained seed inspectors are replaced by untrained staff.

The recovery of seed production costs by seed sales is very weak at the moment. Furthermore, the former Minister of Agriculture and Animal resources informed the BTC and the Embassy that reaching financial sustainability at the end of the intervention was no longer the goal of the Ministry.

All these elements together make that the potential sustainability very weak. Last year we were hopeful that the creation of the Seed Production Unit and the upcoming reform in RAB could bring sustainable change, but this year we can only conclude that it did not happen and will most probably not before the end of the intervention.

For FFS Twigire

At first sight, the potential sustainability of FFS/Twigire Muhinzi looks excellent. Twigire Muhinzi is a real Rwandan home grown solution which gets the full political support from the two implementing line ministries (MINALOC and MINAGRI) as well as from the higher levels. However, there are some serious risks in terms of sustainability:

- Future of the FFS Master Trainers: An important part of FFS Master Trainers are currently financed by the intervention and their future is insecure. All other FFS

Master Trainers have received different functions within RAB and their current work as FFS Master Trainer is an additional task assigned by the DG. We fear that after the funding of the intervention ends, FFS Master Trainers will no longer work as Master Trainer. Nevertheless, we believe their technical knowledge and experience are needed within Twigire Muhinzi, especially to train more FFS Facilitators.

- The financial sustainability: Even though other organization/donors are already involved or have shown keen interest in Twigire Muhinzi, funding for full expansion has not yet been secured while the project's financial support ends in just a few months (end June 2016). Furthermore, there is no consensus about paying FFS facilitators (and farmer promoters) to serve within Twigire Muhinzi. In BTC's opinion, the long term sustainability of Twigire Muhinzi depends on whether or not, these Facilitators (and Farmer Promoters) will be paid for their work. In other words, we fear that the system might collapse because insufficient efforts are being made to guarantee that this critical success factor is addressed in time.

For CICA:

At the start of the program, CICA did not have an official status within MINAGRI, which undermined sustainable financing. With the latest reform, CICA becomes a project in the SPIU of MINAGRI. Being a "project" makes it at least possible for other organizations and donors to finance CICA activities and/or recurrent costs (like salaries), but this is not as sustainable as being a permanent structure within MINAGRI. The potential sustainability fully depends on the success of attracting new donors, and at the moment, one year before the intervention's funding ends, financing by other donors/organization has been limited. The capacity of the staff has been sufficiently built but the question remains if there will be enough budget to maintain the staff and continue activities.


1.5 Conclusions

- The intervention will probably not be able to reach its specific objective of improved access to and use of high quality seed of planting materials. The main cause of the failure is not a lack of technical capacity but a result of the constant changes in the institutional environment for both public seed production and seed quality control. These changes have not only created serious concern and uncertainty about the future direction of the seed sector but also had a direct negative impact on the capacity of the seed sector.
- Although failing to reach the specific objective for seeds, the intervention will through its selected activities provide part of the foundation for the future seed sector. Firstly, the training program of private seed producers with its novel methodology of incorporating proven methodologies from the FFS, will increase the capacity of seed producers. Secondly, the build-in mechanism, linking seed producers to the more advanced regional and local private seed sector is expected to pave the road for local seed production, e.g. hybrid maize. Thirdly, although there are obvious faults in the quality control system, the development of a database and establishment of control plots are required components of the ongoing regional seed harmonisation process in Eastern and Southern Africa. The intervention activities will eventually assist Rwanda in this process.

- The results of the advisory component already exceed the initial expectations and with the integration of FFS in Twigire Muhinzi the number of farmers reached can double or triple in 2015. Furthermore, the sustainability looks good thanks to that integration and the close linkage to local government bodies. Also, several large donors have shown keen interest to further support/finance Twigire Muhinzi. Nevertheless, the real sustainability is fragile, especially since there is still no commitment of the Government to pay the FFS Facilitators as service providers. Currently, the FFS Facilitators are organizing themselves into cooperative and we hope that as such they can be hired as professional service providers. If not, and if the facilitators are expected to work as volunteers, we fear that the whole system will collapse and the facilitators will lose interest in sharing their knowledge.
- The outputs of CICA are diverse, relevant and of high quality. Finally, there seems to be a decision about the institutional future of CICA. While previously it was expected that CICA would become an official part of the permanent government structure, it has finally been placed in the SPIU of MINAGRI. Given the fact that the program financing will end in about 1 year, it is unsure that CICA will continue to operate as it does today, after the end of the intervention.

This Result Report 2014 reflects the opinion of BTC only.

The Director of Intervention (DI) of MINAGRI has a different opinion, especially on the sustainability of the intervention. Therefore we have not requested the DI to sign this document, but we will discuss the key points of divergence on the next Steering committee.

National execution official	BTC execution official
	

2 Results Monitoring

2.1 Evolution of the context

2.1.1 General context

In July 2014, there were important changes made at Rwandan Government level: Cabinet reshuffle and restructuring of the public services. Both changes highly impacted the intervention. The Cabinet reshuffle led to the designation of a new Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources, a new State Minister for Agriculture and a new Permanent Secretary for Minister of Agriculture. The restructuring of the Public Services should have led to new structures for the Minister of Agriculture and for the Rwanda Agriculture Board. At the date of this report (6 month after the start of the reform), these new structures are partially approved by the Rwandan Authorities. Consequently, there are lots of uncertainties about the sustainability of program's activities, results and staff. Unfortunately, the Program has never been part of the discussion about the reform.

Unfortunately, this latest reform did not confirm the recently created Seed Unit. It seems that Rwanda chooses once again for a partially decentralized seed production system which in the past did not deliver. Also the quality control was negatively influenced. While it was expected that this unit would become independent from RAB, it seems that at least for now, it remains embedded within RAB.

The government of Rwanda has launched a new nationwide extension approach (Twigire Muhinzi), which is based on two previous approaches: FFS and Farmer promoters. This confirms the trust the Government has in the FFS approach which was introduced and expanded by this and previous BTC supported interventions. The integration of FFS in Twigire Muhinzi has resulted in a delay in creating new groups but it clearly increases the potential impact.

2.1.2 Institutional context

The changes mentioned above might also have an influence on the anchorage of the intervention. At the moment, the program management is anchored at MINAGRI level, but at one stage, we have been informed that the whole intervention would move to the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) of RAB. Now it seems we will remain at MINAGRI after all.

2.1.3 Management context: execution modalities

No major change occurred in the management modalities in 2014. Co-management remains the main management modality. The Memorandum of understanding signed end-2011 and implemented since 2012 remains valid and was not amended.

2.1.4 Harmo context


The integration of FFS in Twigire Muhinzi is clear evidence of alignment. We work closely with other partners who support it. All activities in the field of advisory services are now fully aligned, not only with MINAGRI, but also with MINALOC.

For Seed, the situation is not clear at the moment. The model which was supported by the intervention was designed by RAB in collaboration with the program and it was approved by MINAGRI. However, it is not confirmed in the latest reform. But since the

reform is only partially implemented (The structure of the SPIU of RAB and MINAGRI has not yet been made public), we are not sure if we are still aligned or not.

In terms of harmonization with other partners, it can be mentioned that we very regularly meet with the EU, the Dutch Embassy, IFDC, Tubura and others to align our support.

2.2 Performance outcome: Improved access to advisory services for crops and livestock and access to and use of high quality planting materials and seed, for men and women



2.2.1 Progress of indicators

Outcome: Improved access to advisory services for crops and livestock and access to and use of high quality planting materials and seed, for men and women					
Indicators	Baseline value	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year 2014	End Target
% of household farmers who received advice in the last 12 months disaggregated by gender *	32%	NA	NA	NA	64%
% of farmers satisfied regarding access to relevant information and advisory services disaggregated by gender *	33%	NA	NA	NA	66%
Quantity of seed purchased by Seed growers to use in the season reported on (in MT): - Pre – basic - Basic (True Seed) - Basic (Potato)	0 70 135	NA NA NA	0 59 0	NA NA NA	(As to operational plan) For 2014: PB: B (TS): B (Po):
Quantity of seed produced by private sector (in MT) - QDS - CS	NA 79 (Potato)	NA 2804	611 6958	NA NA	(As to operational plan) For 2014: CS+QDS: 28,065

2.2.2 Analysis of progress made

Improved access to high quality planting material

Overall, the access to formal high quality planting material produced in Rwanda has not yet improved due to a failing seed production system. Although the production of commercial seed (CS and QDS) has increased significantly compared to 2013, it is still far below the target. The intervention has tried to support RAB/MINAGRI to improve the system, but the important changes that were agreed upon, were not implemented.

- The RAB Seed Production Unit would work as an independent self-financing unit in charge of seed production and sales. In other words, a dedicated team would produce seed in an efficient way and use the revenue from seed sales to produce new seed. Unfortunately, despite an initial good start, the unit still fails to produce large quantities of quality seed and fails to generate sufficient revenue from seed sales. Currently, the revenue only generates 5% of the direct production cost. Furthermore, there seems to be no real intention of Rwanda to create a financial self-sustainable unit.
- The Seed Quality control system was functioning reasonably well but there were two main issues: The unit should become independent from the Seed Production Unit and the range of tests conducted should be extended. Unfortunately, the latest reform put the unit once again within RAB and competent key staff members have been removed from the seed inspection unit, resulting in a lower capacity than years ago. Even though important progress has been made as well (progress in the creation of a comprehensive database, post control plots, etc...) this progress will not contribute as much as anticipated to the outcome due to the experience and knowledge loss in seed quality control system.

Despite the worrying situation on the side of public seed production and quality control, there are improvements made on the side of the private seed sector. The approach for supporting and enhancing the private seed growers has been completely changed by the intervention. The training curriculum and methodology have been completely reviewed and fine-tuned to the real needs for seed growers. The Program capitalized on lessons learned from the FFS approach and is now offering a practical on-field training cycle for seed growers. Even if the public seed production system would continue to work below expectations, these well trained private seed growers can work directly with private seed companies. In that way, we believe that these activities will significantly contribute to an increased access to high quality planting material in the future.

There are also improvements made on the side of the informal seed sector which is the predominant seed producer and provider in Rwanda. Efforts have been made for training farmers in producing their own quality seed and produce seed for sale purposes (eg. positive selection in potato).

Improved access to advisory services

The program has already contributed to an increase in the access to advisory services by directly reaching out to 100,000 farmers in FFS and 242,000 farmers in CMC. Furthermore, the full integration of FFS within the new national extension system Twigire Muhinzi, will further increase the number of direct and indirect beneficiaries.

The fully trained and experienced 2500 FFS facilitators, who are a direct output of the program, are the key building block of the whole Twigire extension system. This new model aims to reach every single farmer of Rwanda. In 2015, a demonstration plot will be

established in every single village in Rwanda. This plot will serve as a learning place for all farmers in the village. Furthermore, by the end of 2015, one FFS group with each its own FFS learning plot will be established in every village as well. The FFS facilitators have a double function within Twigire Muhinzi. First of all, they continue to create new FFS groups at a rate of 2 new groups by every facilitator. Secondly, they will train the 14,800 farmer promoters in setting up the demonstration plots in every village. The techniques demonstrated in the demonstration plots are based on the best FFS practices.

The fully trained FFS Master trainers of RAB, another important direct output of the program, are among the key staff to coordinate the new Twigire extension approach.

Another important contribution to increasing the access to advisory services is the outputs of CICA. The CICA information and communication strategy has been completely reviewed and changed with a clear focus on agriculture extension workers and farmers. Based on this strategy, the deliverables were completely adapted to this target audience and the dissemination has improved.

2.2.3 Potential Impact

On the side of the seed, it is once again the FFS component that increases the access to quality seed, thanks to the improved production of informal farmer saved seed.

Unfortunately the access to formal seed produced in Rwanda has not yet increased much and it is unlikely that the output of RAB will improve strongly any time soon. On a positive note, we do see a more active private sector who are keen to produce quality seeds in the country. When they link up with better performing private seed growers, they could make a difference in the future.

An important drawback for the development of the professional private seed production is the fact that quality control remains under RAB. It will be hard for companies to have confidence in the reliability of the quality control system, which is executed by their competitor, RAB.

In conclusion, the potential to make the difference in the future probably rests with the private sector (formal seed) and with the farmers themselves (informal seed). But, even though the private sector can take over the seed production for commercial crops, there is a concern for less profitable crops. This is where a well functioning public seed production system needs to deliver. If the efforts of the public sector would focus only on these crops, the outputs would possibly be better.

For the advisory component, the potential future impact depends on the success of Twigire Muhinzi. If the Twigire Muhinzi receives funding from the government and/or donors and if the funds are well used, the potential is huge. However, a number of risk have been identified (See 1.4.4. Potential sustainability).


In order to ensure sustainability and therefore potential impact, FFS facilitators were also encouraged to create FFS facilitators cooperatives in order to become a professional service provider and allow them to be contracted by local authorities. The districts will receive more and more earmarked funding for agricultural extension, so it is likely that district are interested to sign a contract with such cooperatives.

Twigire Muhinzi directly contributes to the food security of the farmers themselves and of the people who buy the products at the market. The agricultural production increases with more than 50% and it also contributes to the reduction of poverty as they are selling their

surplus production.

The future potential impact of CICA depends on the degree of success to attract future funding. Currently several organizations and donors show interest. Partial funding of the private sector is also possible through advertisement. Since CICA has not been integrated within the permanent structure of MINAGRI, it is unlikely that the government itself will continue to finance CICA staff and activities.

2.3 Performance output 1: Seed production chains of specific groups of food crops with a market value are professionalized



2.3.1 Progress of indicators

Output 1: Seed production chains of specific groups of food crops with a market value are professionalized					
Indicators	Baseline value (season 2012 B)	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year 2014	End Target
% of quality seed inspected fields in compliance with required standards disaggregated by gender					
PB (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	96	92	NA	100
B (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	47	86	NA	100
QDS(All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	93	23	NA	100
CS (All/Males/Females/Coop)	80/74/75/82	77	84	NA	100
% of seed lots in compliance with required national standards					
PB	NA	40	0	NA	100
B	NA	67	77	NA	100
QDS	NA	68	76	NA	100
CS	67	84	90	NA	100
% of area planted compared to operational plan					
PB	NA	92	NA	NA	95
B	NA	92	NA	NA	95
QDS	NA	NA	NA	NA	95
CS	NA	NA	NA	NA	95

% of quantity produced compared to operational plan					
PB	NA	NA	NA	NA	95
B	NA	NA	NA	NA	95
QDS	NA	NA	NA	NA	95
CS	NA	NA	NA	NA	95
Quantity of Seed produced by seed growers and purchased by farmers (in MT)					
CS True seed	176	NA	NA	NA	As to operational plans
CS Potato	34	NA	NA	NA	
% of seed of new released varieties purchased by farmers					
CS	23	NA	NA	NA	46%
QDS	NA	NA	NA	NA	46%

2.3.2 Progress of main activities

Progress of <u>main</u> activities	Progress:			
	A	B	C	D
1 Implementing the new public seed system (RAB Seed Production unit), inclusive of an effective reporting system by RAB				X
2 Improving the seed infrastructure				X
3 Support to improved seed production planning & production		X		
4 Support to the seed quality control (day to day, database, control plots, ...)		X		
5.Potato minituber production			X	
6.Support to the fight against MLND		X		

2.3.3 Analysis of progress made

The Seed Production Unit - Public Seed Production

In 2013, an important internal reform in RAB created the Seed Production Unit, which would be in charge of the public seed production and seed sales. This unit had the potential to bring the important change that was urgently needed to improve the system. Unfortunately, during 2014, it became clear that the change did not happen.

While the program delivered the expected support both in terms of technical and financial aspects, RAB did not implement all its commitments. Immediately after the decision for this reform was taken in the SC, the situation looked good; dedicated staff was assigned to the unit and seed appeared to be produced according to plan. Unfortunately, many other aspects of the seed production and sales were not improved: Especially the fact that there is still no transparency in amounts of seed produced and sold is unacceptable. In fact, the Seed Production Unit has never been completely implemented as agreed upon. It has never been officially created within the RAB structure and finally it is also not institutionalized in the new reform. Even though a 5-person Seed Production Unit appears in the RAB structure at central level, other seed staff is again decentralized and processes that should be managed in a centralized way, are once again decentralized. So the current 'seed production unit' it is very different from 30 person centrally managed Seed Production Unit as earlier agreed.

So until today, sales cannot be traced and the program does not have any reasonable assurance as regards to correctness and completeness of bookings of sales and revenues. The only thing that is clear from the limited reporting is that the majority of the seed produced is actually sold for consumption and thus not as seed! Since the price for consumption is considerable lower than the price of seed, it leads to financial losses. By the end of 2014, the financial support of the program for public seed production has come close to an end. Unfortunately, there is nothing else to do than to accept that the program failed to bring change to this component of the seed sector.

The program committed to finance the rehabilitation of seed drying grounds and seed

stores. RAB committed to complete the procurement processes and they actually refused direct involved/support of the program in the process. Unfortunately, the delays in procurement have accumulated to such an extent that the works can never be completed within timeframe of the program. The only solution is to cancel this activity and reallocate the foreseen budget towards other successful activities.

Seed Quality control

As regards the quality control, support given to this activity was of quality and timely. Some positive results were achieved such as the implementation of post control plots and the development of a comprehensive database will improve the traceability of seed lots and reliability of data in the future.

The control plots allow comparing outputs from the control plots with outputs from seed growers plots. So in case seed growers would complain about seed quality this could be checked with the control plot results and root cause of the gap, if any, could be determined (quality of the seed, of the soil, of the inputs...). Furthermore, control plots serve as an internal control mechanism of the seed quality system.

Support to the fight against MLND

Efforts were also made on the side of fighting disease in maize (MLND) which is heavily impacting the maize production in Rwanda. The intervention linked MINAGRI/RAB to CIMMYT, which is the regional centre of excellence about MLND. Some RAB staff members were trained by CIMMYT and CIMMYT assisted Rwanda to develop a strategy for combatting and monitoring the disease. A task force has been set up to coordinate and monitor the related activities.

2.4 Performance output 2: Increased private sector involvement in the seed sector

2.4.1 Progress of indicators

Output 2: Increased private sector involvement in the seed sector					
Indicators	Baseline value (season 2012 B)	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year 2014	End Target
Number of active registered seed growers (true seed & potato)					
PB (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
B (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
QDS(All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
CS (All/Males/Females/Coop)	127/56/19/52	160	236	NA	400

Number of active registered seed growers (banana, cassava, fruit nursery)					
PB (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	NA		NA	NA
B (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	NA		NA	NA
QDS(All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	NA		NA	NA
CS (All/Males/Females/Coop)	NA	NA	1	NA	1000
% of active registered seed growers who have open credit for seed business purpose disaggregated by gender					
CS (All/Males/Females/Coop)	27/31/33/21	NA	NA	NA	60
% of active registered seed growers satisfied with service delivery from RAB disaggregated by gender	NA	NA	NA	NA	80%
% of Agro dealers/wholesalers selling small packages of CS to farmers and outlets (true seed)	5%	NA	NA	NA	50%
Number of seed companies registered in the seed sector in Rwanda	NA	5	6	NA	15

2.4.2 Progress of main activities

Progress of <u>main</u> activities	Progress:			
	A	B	C	D
1. Support to private seed growers (business & seed growers association)		X		
2. Support to Genebank		X		
3. Support to the informal seed sector			X	
4. Training for private screen house owners (by RAB)			X	

2.4.3 Analysis of progress made

Support to Private seed production

For private seed growers, training format has been completely reviewed and changed.

The current training fits better to seed grower's needs. It is an 'in-the-field' pragmatic training based on lessons learned from the successful FFS methodology. The training is well appreciated by the seed growers itself, the staff and management of RAB and by the private seed companies. We are hopeful that these companies will sign contracts with the private seed growers as out-growers.

Genebank

Support to genebank is currently being implemented. A highly qualified regional expert (The curator of Kenya gene bank for 12 years) was recruited mid-October 2014. He will train the staff and support RAB in developing a strategy and action plan to run a professional gene bank. When he arrived, insufficient staff was available, but RAB has now solved that problem as the new RAB structures foresees 5 gene bank positions.

Informal Seed

With regards to the support to the informal seed sector, it has been officially recognized as a program activity in the seed component. A specific budget has been allocated for this important activity. Most activities are carried out with FFS facilitators for implementing "positive selection" activities. This positive selection allows to sort farmers' best agricultural outputs to be used as seed (farmer saved seed) by himself or to be sold to other farmers as farmer saved seed. Support to the informal seed production is important for several reasons: improved seed leads to higher productivity and farmer saved seed is available at an accessible price. In other words, the overall access to quality seed is increased.

The aspect which needs to be improved is the link between the formal and informal seed production.

Screen house owners

Activities related to the training of screen house owners should be implemented by RAB. Upon RAB's request budget was allocated to this during the September steering committee. Regretfully, until now, no activity have been proposed, planned or implemented by RAB.

2.5 Performance output 3: Sustainable mechanisms for demand articulation and responsiveness of market-oriented advisory services

2.5.1 Progress of indicators

Output 3: Sustainable mechanisms for demand articulation and responsiveness of market-oriented advisory services					
Indicators	Baseline value (31/12/2012)	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year 2014	End Target
Number of FFS Facilitators disaggregated by gender					
Total	1570	2547	2531		2500
% Female	26%	28%	28%		30%
Number of FFS groups	2547	3414	4178	6500	5000

% of FFS Facilitators being member of a Facilitators' cooperative/company					
Total/Male/Female	7/8/6	NA	1%		50/50/50
% of Facilitators' cooperatives/companies being paid for the advisory services they provide	0%	100%	NA		100%
% of FFS Facilitators providing paid services in agriculture					
Total/Male/Female	7/7/6	9/9/10	NA		30/30/30
% of FFS groups paying for the advisory services received from qualified trainers (from 2 nd season)	0%	0%	0%		30%
% of FFS groups selling more than 50% of the production to the market	50%	55%	61.9%		90%
% of FFS groups that are registered as cooperative (at least at district level)	3%	3.4%	2.1%		60%

2.5.2 Progress of main activities

Progress of <u>main</u> activities	Progress:			
	A	B	C	D
1 Training of FFS facilitators		X		
2 Graduation of FFS facilitators			X	
2 Creating and training new FFS groups			X	
3 Training of Rwandan FFS Master Trainers + graduation		x		
4 Support FFS facilitators to form cooperatives		x		
5 Develop process to make farmers pay for the FFS facilitators				x
6 Development of a nationwide comprehensive extension system based on FFS and Farmer Promoters (Twigire Muhinzi)		x		

2.5.3 Analysis of progress made

In 2014, all facilitators completed their training cycles and the program reached its final target of 2500 facilitators. A large mass graduation event in Kigali was in full preparation to take place in the end of 2014, but a few weeks before the event, the Minister of Agriculture and Animal resources and the Minister of MINALOC requested the program to review the concept and to consider 4 provincial events instead. The graduation event is therefore delayed to 2015.

44 FFS Master Trainers also successfully completed their training and coaching cycles and they officially graduated in September 2014. The first important task of the master trainers is to assist with the transition of FFS as a project within RAB to the full integration in the Twigire Muhinzi extension system. Their function is not only to provide backstopping the FFS facilitators, but also to liaise with districts and sectors for successful implementation of Twigire Muhinzi.

The FFS facilitators have a double function within Twigire Muhinzi. First of all, they continue to create new FFS groups at a rate of 2 new groups by every facilitator. Secondly, they will train the 14,837 farmer promoters in setting up a demonstration plot in every village of Rwanda. The techniques demonstrated in the demonstration plots are based on the best FFS practices. In order to be well prepared for this massive undertaking (5000 new FFS groups and 14,800 demonstration plots), it was decided to take a step back in the second season of 2014. That is the reason why less new FFS groups were created than planned for in 2014.

The program, in collaboration with the Rwanda Cooperative Agency, organized 30 district meetings with all FFS facilitators in order to encourage the FFS facilitators to create their own cooperative within their respective districts. At least 1 such cooperative is now already established and in almost all others districts, they are in the process of being created. The creation of these cooperatives is very important for the sustainability of FFS. It is probably the only way how the FFS facilitators can be paid as services providers after the end of the Program. It will indeed allow them to be contracted by the districts as well as by other stakeholders.

Despite the clear decision of the Steering Committee to encourage FFS groups which were interested in being trained in a second crop to pay by themselves for the service that would receive from an FFS facilitator, the field staff did not deliver this message to FFS facilitators. This shows that the issue of payment by farmers is a very difficult one. The main reason is that FFS facilitators do not feel comfortable to ask money from poor farmers. This is a consequence of the fact that Rwandan authorities often call upon their citizens to deliver services on a voluntary basis for the development of their community and the country.

Consequently, till now, payments by farmers for services rendered by a FFS facilitator are still an exception and are made on ad-hoc basis. FFS facilitators are still used to be paid by the Program for providing services to farmers. We fear that payment by farmers will never occur on a large scale and will remain an exception. This point once again stresses the importance of the creation of the facilitators' cooperatives. Once organized as a professional service provider, the FFS facilitators will no longer be expected to work on a voluntary basis for all the work they would do. In fact, they themselves will have the power to negotiate with the authorities which kind of service can be done on a voluntary basis and which kind of work would require payment.

2.6 Performance output 4: Proximity agricultural advisors capable of delivering responses to the demands of farmers, livestock keepers and their organizations

2.6.1 Progress of indicators

Output 4: Proximity agricultural advisors capable of delivering responses to the demands of farmers, livestock keepers and their organizations					
Indicator	Baseline value (31/12/2012)	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year 2014	End Target
% of FFS groups that report an increase in production of the priority commodities through the use of ICM-FFS practices	99%	99%	NA		100%
Number of trained farmers through					
FFS: Total	24,500	86,262	102,634	162,500	120,000
FFS: % females	NA	48			50
CMC: Total	0	151,751	242,109	180,000	200,000
CMC: % Female	0	43			45
% of trained farmers who adopted the appropriate production practices		80/NA/NA	70	80/80/80	
Total/%Male/%Female	68/71/66	(potato only)			80/80/80
Number of identified varieties (genetic resources) maintained and appropriately used through FFS	82	88	88	95	110
% increase in crop income for farmers organized in FFS groups			NA		
Total/%Male/%Female	94/89/99	NA			80/75/90
% of commodity programmes of RAB which adopted and use the FFS approach	40	69 (11 out of 15)	69	69	60
Number of projects/programmes who received FFS technical advice from RAB/SSPAT2	6	15	15	16	12

Hectare of land under CMC					
Banana rehabilitation	2,542	5,644	NA		30,000
BXW control (banana)	1,229	2,146			NA
Striga control (cereals)	4,338	4,338			10,000

2.6.2 Progress of main activities

Progress of <u>main</u> activities	Progress:			
	A	B	C	D
1. Production of extension materials (Booklets, Manuals, Magazine, Videos, Radio sketches, ...)		x		
2. Promoting/facilitating of the use of the information & extension tools (Extension website, stakeholder linkages, ...)		X		
3. Training of agricultural journalists		x		
4. Training of farmers in FFS groups + implementation of the good agronomic practices		x		
5. Implementing CMC activities		x		
6. Preparation for full integration of FFS in Twigire Muhinzi		x		
7. Set up a comprehensive reporting and M&E system for FFS/Twigire Muhinzi			x	
8. HIV awareness training in FFS groups			x	

2.6.3 Analysis of progress made

CICA

Important changes have been achieved in CICA, which is now performing better and better in terms of output delivery as well as in being recognized as the centre for producing and disseminating information about agriculture. This year the products include training manuals, training videos, an extension magazine, capitalization products (booklet, video, ...), radio shows etc. More and more stakeholders are associated in development of material and participate in their costs.

An innovation of this year is the comical sketches on the radio. Famous actors translate extension message into funny radio sketches that attract large audiences. Radio is still the best way to reach millions of farmers. After being broadcasted, these sketches remain available for farmers and extension workers on CICA's extension website. Every extension material developed for extension workers and farmers is available on this website. In a just a few clicks users get access to training videos, extension materials and radio sketches.

A new activity is the training of agricultural journalists with the aim to better inform about agricultural topics. This close link between CICA and the journalists is expected to result in higher quality articles and reports about agriculture.

FFS at village level

Like previous years, FFS activities are well implemented at farmers' level. FFS Facilitators continue to work with FFS groups, resulting in impressive increases in yields as well as in social benefits for their members (health insurance, self-confidence, improved revenues...).

In 2014, some of FFS groups were involved in fertilizer trials and demonstrations from IFDC. Such kind of collaboration is very interesting for all parties.

CMC

2014 was also characterized by an intensification of the Community Mobilization Campaigns for fighting BXW disease that largely affects all regions of Rwanda. Through a country-wide campaign which was implemented in the 1st quarter of 2014, more than 90,000 additional farmers participated in banana plantation rehabilitation campaigns, bringing the total to 242,000 farmers that participated in CMC. These campaigns were jointly organized by RAB and local authorities. The field work was led by the FFS facilitators who transferred their knowledge to farmers for combatting the disease but also for preventing its resurgence.

Twigire Muhinzi

Since 2014, our intervention is working closely with other partners who support Twigire Muhinzi, particularly One Acre Fund - Tubura and the capacity building project of AGI. This has resulted in a well-coordinated approach at RAB level and together we coordinate the linkage between MINAGRI and MINALOC. While FFS was previously operating as a Belgian funded project within RAB, it is now fully integrated and linked to the agronomist at sector and district level.

HIV

The plan of the intervention to implement activities around HIV with the FFS facilitators and FFS groups is finally approved by the steering committee. The main idea is to explore the opportunity to use the FFS facilitators as peer trainers on HIV awareness raising. The Rwanda Biomedical Centre will train and coach the facilitators in their work. We encountered some delays in the implementation but activities are now planned for 2015.

2.7 Performance output 5: Lessons learned on agricultural advisory services and seed documented and used in policy and decision making

2.7.1 Progress of indicators

Output 5: Lessons learned on agricultural advisory services and seed documented and used in policy and decision making					
Indicators	Baseline value (31/12/2012)	Value year 2013	Value year 2014	Target year N (2013)	End Target

Number of documented programme lessons referred to in policies, strategies and action plans	Not relevant	NA	NA	/	NA
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2.7.2 Progress of main activities

Progress of <u>main</u> activities	Progress:			
	A	B	C	D
1 Participation on discussions about strategies and policies related to agricultural sector		x		
2 Overall follow up and monitoring of activities carried out			x	
3. Field assessment of CMC impact		X		
4. Gender Training in FFS			x	
5. Capitalization of FFS (Booklet, Video, ...)		x		

2.7.3 Analysis of progress made

With regards to discussions about strategies and policies related to agricultural sector, the program is part of the Agriculture sector working group and is co-chairing the sub-sector working group on extension. The Program is also an active player in the sub-sector working group on seeds. The Program has been involved in development of implementation plan and integration of FFS within the new extension model adopted by Rwanda. Nevertheless, the Program is not associated in every strategic decisions regarding agriculture where it could add value. For instance, it has not been associated at all in the reform of institutions in charge of implementing agriculture policies. This led to the unfortunate changes in the seed unit in the latest reform of RAB. On other parts of the reform, as the program was not consulted beforehand, the Program can only react about what was decided and try to integrate within these new structures. This leads to several uncertainties.

Concerning the monitoring of activities, progress was made in order to follow-up and to have reliable data about all FFS farmers and FFS groups. An IT-tool used by Tubura (One Acre Fund) for RAB is now being used for FFS as well. It allows to monitor activities and to gather data through a central SMS-system. This will replace all costly meetings with FFS facilitators, reduce the number of on-site visits, reduce the paper copies but also allow to quickly gathering information and survey FFS facilitators or groups on specific topics.

In 2014, the outcome of CMC activities related to BXW were assessed. This assessment showed that in:

- 31% of the areas rehabilitated the disease did not show up again;
- 37% of the areas rehabilitated the disease reappeared but immediate remediation actions were implemented;
- 28% of the areas rehabilitated the disease reappeared but with a smaller

- intensity;
- 4% of the areas rehabilitated the disease reappeared with the same intensity.

It also showed that in 59% of rehabilitated areas the productivity of banana bunches increased with at least 50% and that in 25% of the areas rehabilitated the productivity of the banana bunches doubled.

The development of a database for seed quality control should result in more reliable data about seed in future.

2.8 Transversal Themes

2.8.1 Gender

As regards to gender no specific activities were implemented in 2014. Nevertheless it has been agreed by Steering Committee that it is an important topic and that specific activities should be implemented. Gender is also identified by the farmers themselves as one of the areas that they want to learn more about. Therefore, the previously cancelled plan to hire Gender master trainers has been re-initiated. The master trainers will train selected FFS facilitators about gender topics with a focus on positive masculinity. Given the fact that 70% of the FFS facilitators are male, the training will focus being positive role models. Sensitive topics such as gender-based violence will also be addressed.

At the end of 2014, the program also agreed to finance the gender expert at MINAGRI level. Her role is to support all MINAGRI interventions in gender mainstreaming and gender specific activities. She has also a particular focus on evaluating the value to peer to peer support on gender issues.

2.8.2 Environment

The program is contributing to promote the use of ICM (Integrated Crop Management) practices in all the training sessions organized for farmers. This has an impact in terms of better management of natural resources like (i) rational use of inputs reducing the quantities of both seeds and mineral fertilizers, (ii) a decreased use of pesticides for crop protection, (iii) protection and conservation of natural enemies which contribute to control insect pests, (iv) conservation of genetic resources, (v) global improvement of soil fertility and improvement of soil structure through continuous increase of organic matter content of the soil.

Based on these various facts, we can state that this programme is contributing significantly to improve environmental protection through the use of the ICM package as the basic package of the training process.

2.8.3 HIV

See output 4.

2.9 Risk management

As regards the risks mentioned in our last year result report, quite a lot of them occurred and became issues. Last year, Programme could not reach a consensus about the risk evaluation. According BTC point of view most of the risks identified were at a very high level, according partner point of view these risks were not existing as there was an ongoing reform and they were confident it would solve the risks. In the fact, the reform did not remediate any of the risks identified. On contrary either it destroyed what was in place or it exacerbated the risk which finally became an issue.

Description of Risk	Period of identification	Risk category	Probability	Potential Impact	Total	Action(s)	Resp.	Deadline	Progress	Status
Quality control would not move fast enough (before June 2014) for the programme to improve it	2014Q1	Sustainability	High	High	VH				Finally it has been fully integrated within RAB – no independency at all	Issue
SEED infrastructures would not be completed by the end of Dec 2015 - this could endanger the availability and the quality of seeds	2014Q1	Sustainability	High	High	VH	Commitment of RAB to submit files on time		Sept 2014	Did not respect the deadline	Issue
						Deadline extended	SMCL	March 2015	RAB will not meet the new deadline – even drawing and ToR are not ready	

Financial sustainability of Seed unit could be endangered if seed produced are not sold according to the cost recovery plan or if varieties produced are not the ones requested by the market	2014Q1	Sustainability	High	High	VH	Review seed production plan (more realistic)	RAB		Done for season 2015B – but demand for seed does not exist (or at least paying demand)	Issue
						Decrease seed production losses	RAB		No improvement	
CICA could not become sustainable if staff currently paid by the programme do not become permanent staff or if their costs cannot be recovered through CICA's revenues	2014Q1	Sustainability	High	High	VH	Enhance the sales of seed (tracability of payment, avoid sales for consumption...)	RAB		No improvement – no effective demand	Issue
						Work towards CICA products that can generate income and/or that can attract sponsors	CICA		Part of deliverable are now funded by other donors – possibility of sponsorship identified	

	If could be completed before end of program, potentially extend the deadline (to be approved by Steering committee)		Program	Reminder to RAB about deadline						
		01 May 15	Program/ RAB	Continue the promotion of FFS Fac Cooperatives to work as professional service providers		High	High	Med	Sustainability	01/2015
			Program/RA B	Work directly with the districts to promote performance contracts with the Fac Coops		High				Twigire Muhinzi might collapse if no sustainable mechanism to finance the FFS Facilitators is set up

3 Steering and Learning

3.1 Strategic re-orientations

Twigire Muhinzi

The (financial) sustainability of Twigire Muhinzi is not secured. The key to success lays in creating a strong working relation between the district authorities and the district cooperative of FFS Facilitators. Therefore the Program need to focus on:

- Closely follow up the process for the creation of FFS Facilitator's cooperative in each district
- Ensure that the district authorities recognize the value that these cooperative can bring to the development of the district, in Twigire Muhinzi and beyond. Also make sure that decision makers understand that the FFS facilitators are professional service providers, who should be paid for their services.
- Facilitate a formal working relation between the district and the district facilitators cooperative, preferably in terms of a performance contract.
- Explore potential sources of funding, especially within funds that are already committed to agricultural development, to assist the district to finance the contract with the facilitator's cooperative.
- Assess the option to use funds from the intervention to pilot such financing in at least 12 districts in season 2016A.

Seed

It is important to accept that the program is no longer in the position to bring significant change to the whole seed sector. Nevertheless, the program can still significantly contribute to specific elements such as:

- Capacity building of private seed growers, including the link to seed companies.
- Support the seed quality control, especially with establishing a comprehensive database & control plots
- Support the informal seed systems

In order to be successful in these elements, it is important to remain focused.

3.2 Recommendations

Recommendations	Actor	Deadline
<i>Intensify the collaboration with district authorities in order to facilitate the working relationship between them and the facilitators cooperatives</i>	<i>Program management & RAB</i>	Q2 2015
<i>Reallocate budget from activities that need to be cancelled due to unrecoverable delays to financial support to districts to finance or co-finance the performance contract between districts and facilitator's cooperatives.</i>	<i>Steering committee</i>	Q1 2015

3.3 Lessons Learned

Support to the formal seed sector vs support to informal sector?

BTC has supported the formal seed sector for many years during several interventions in Rwanda. Although there are obviously some successes, overall, the support to the formal seed sector is not reaching its objectives. This is not due to a lack of technical or financial support, neither to the lack of capacity or willingness to perform well by the national technical staff involved but rather to too many changes in the institutional set up and an unrealistic vision for the seed sector (too much focus on formal, not enough on informal). Unfortunately, BTC is not consulted and therefore has limited influence. Even more, the improvements that were made have been hampered in the various institutional changes. It should also be noted that the effective demand for (expensive) formal seed will only be known when subsidies are questionable, particularly with the food insecure population.

Another reflection is that our financial support might have actually hampered the development of a self-financing seed production system as well as the development of a viable private seed sector.

In contrast, efforts to improve the informal seed systems seem to be more successful and they have a direct effect on improved food security. However, since the importance of this informal system is often not fully recognized by the decision makers, these support activities are often not sustainable.

Given our mission to reduce poverty, BTC should reflect on the ultimate impact on poverty reduction of supporting formal and informal seed systems. Professionalization of informal seed systems (for example by setting up internal quality control systems among informal seed producers) could be a good option, not only to increase the access to affordable improved seed, but also to create an effective demand for quality seed and thus certified seed on the long run. However, it is crucial that the partner country is recognizing the importance of the informal seed sector and is ready to professionalize it. This should be discussed during identification and formulation. In case the partner only believes in a formal seed sector, BTC should probably consider not to support it. If we do support the formal sector, effective mechanisms to support the private sector directly should be explored. Our support to the public sector in the formal seed could be limited to the defined roles of the public sector such as Quality control, variety release, etc.

We recommend an in depth reflection on all seed interventions to be organized by BTC (EST HQ).

4 Annexes

4.1 Quality criteria

For the Seed Component

1. RELEVANCE: The degree to which the intervention is in line with local and national policies and priorities as well as with the expectations of the beneficiaries				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment RELEVANCE: total score	A	B	C	D
			X	
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the intervention?				
X	A	Clearly still embedded in national policies and Belgian strategy, responds to aid effectiveness commitments, highly relevant to needs of target group.		
	B	Still fits well in national policies and Belgian strategy (without always being explicit), reasonably compatible with aid effectiveness commitments, relevant to target group's needs.		
	C	Some issues regarding consistency with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid effectiveness or relevance.		
	D	Contradictions with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid efficiency commitments; relevance to needs is questionable. Major adaptations needed.		
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic still holding true?				
	A	Clear and well-structured intervention logic; feasible and consistent vertical logic of objectives; adequate indicators; Risks and Assumptions clearly identified and managed; exit strategy in place (if applicable).		
	B	Adequate intervention logic although it might need some improvements regarding hierarchy of objectives, indicators, Risk and Assumptions.		
X	C	Problems with intervention logic may affect performance of intervention and capacity to monitor and evaluate progress; improvements necessary.		
	D	Intervention logic is faulty and requires major revision for the intervention to have a chance of success.		

2. EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE: Degree to which the resources of the intervention (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been converted into results in an economical way				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least two 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B', no 'C' or 'D' = B; at least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment EFFICIENCY : total score	A	B	C	D
			X	
2.1 How well are inputs (financial, HR, goods & equipment) managed?				
	A	All inputs are available on time and within budget.		

X	B	Most inputs are available in reasonable time and do not require substantial budget adjustments. However there is room for improvement.
	C	Availability and usage of inputs face problems, which need to be addressed; otherwise results may be at risk.
	D	Availability and management of inputs have serious deficiencies, which threaten the achievement of results. Substantial change is needed.
2.2 How well is the implementation of activities managed?		
	A	Activities implemented on schedule
	B	Most activities are on schedule. Delays exist, but do not harm the delivery of outputs
X	C	Activities are delayed. Corrections are necessary to deliver without too much delay.
	D	Serious delay. Outputs will not be delivered unless major changes in planning.
2.3 How well are outputs achieved?		
	A	All outputs have been and most likely will be delivered as scheduled with good quality contributing to outcomes as planned.
	B	Output delivery is and will most likely be according to plan, but there is room for improvement in terms of quality, coverage and timing.
X	C	Some output are/will be not delivered on time or with good quality. Adjustments are necessary.
	D	Quality and delivery of outputs has and most likely will have serious deficiencies. Major adjustments are needed to ensure that at least the key outputs are delivered on time.

3. EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE: Degree to which the outcome (Specific Objective) is achieved as planned at the end of year N				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment EFFECTIVENESS : total score	A	B	C	D
			X	
3.1 As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the outcome to be achieved?				
	A	Full achievement of the outcome is likely in terms of quality and coverage. Negative effects (if any) have been mitigated.		
	B	Outcome will be achieved with minor limitations; negative effects (if any) have not caused much harm.		
X	C	Outcome will be achieved only partially among others because of negative effects to which management was not able to fully adapt. Corrective measures have to be taken to improve ability to achieve outcome.		
	D	The intervention will not achieve its outcome unless major, fundamental measures are taken.		
3.2 Are activities and outputs adapted (when needed), in order to achieve the outcome?				
	A	The intervention is successful in adapting its strategies / activities and outputs to changing external conditions in order to achieve the outcome. Risks and assumptions are managed in a proactive manner.		

X	B	The intervention is relatively successful in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in order to achieve its outcome. Risks management is rather passive.
	C	The intervention has not entirely succeeded in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in a timely or adequate manner. Risk management has been rather static. An important change in strategies is necessary in order to ensure the intervention can achieve its outcome.
	D	The intervention has failed to respond to changing external conditions, risks were insufficiently managed. Major changes are needed to attain the outcome.

4. POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY: The degree of likelihood to maintain and reproduce the benefits of an intervention in the long run (beyond the implementation period of the intervention).					
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: At least 3 'A's, no 'C' or 'D' = A ; Maximum two 'C's, no 'D' = B; At least three 'C's, no 'D' = C ; At least one 'D' = D</i>					
Assessment POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY : total score		A	B	C	D
					X
4.1 Financial/economic viability?					
	A	Financial/economic sustainability is potentially very good: costs for services and maintenance are covered or affordable; external factors will not change that.			
	B	Financial/economic sustainability is likely to be good, but problems might arise namely from changing external economic factors.			
	C	Problems need to be addressed regarding financial sustainability either in terms of institutional or target groups costs or changing economic context.			
X	D	Financial/economic sustainability is very questionable unless major changes are made.			
4.2 What is the level of ownership of the intervention by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?					
	A	The steering committee and other relevant local structures are strongly involved in all stages of implementation and are committed to continue producing and using results.			
	B	Implementation is based in a good part on the steering committee and other relevant local structures, which are also somewhat involved in decision-making. Likelihood of sustainability is good, but there is room for improvement.			
X	C	The intervention uses mainly ad-hoc arrangements and the steering committee and other relevant local structures to ensure sustainability. Continued results are not guaranteed. Corrective measures are needed.			
	D	The intervention depends completely on ad-hoc structures with no prospect of sustainability. Fundamental changes are needed to enable sustainability.			
4.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between intervention and policy level?					
	A	Policy and institutions have been highly supportive of intervention and will continue to be so.			
	B	Policy and policy enforcing institutions have been generally supportive, or at least have not hindered the intervention, and are likely to continue to be so.			
X	C	Intervention sustainability is limited due to lack of policy support. Corrective measures are needed.			
	D	Policies have been and likely will be in contradiction with the intervention. Fundamental changes needed to make intervention sustainable.			
4.4 How well is the intervention contributing to institutional and management capacity?					

	A	Intervention is embedded in institutional structures and has contributed to improve the institutional and management capacity (even if this is not an explicit goal).
	B	Intervention management is well embedded in institutional structures and has somewhat contributed to capacity building. Additional expertise might be required. Improvements in order to guarantee sustainability are possible.
X	C	Intervention relies too much on ad-hoc structures instead of institutions; capacity building has not been sufficient to fully ensure sustainability. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	Intervention is relying on ad hoc and capacity transfer to existing institutions, which could guarantee sustainability, is unlikely unless fundamental changes are undertaken.

For the advisory component (excluding CICA)

1. RELEVANCE: The degree to which the intervention is in line with local and national policies and priorities as well as with the expectations of the beneficiaries				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment RELEVANCE: total score	A	B	C	D
	X			
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the intervention?				
X	A	Clearly still embedded in national policies and Belgian strategy, responds to aid effectiveness commitments, highly relevant to needs of target group.		
	B	Still fits well in national policies and Belgian strategy (without always being explicit), reasonably compatible with aid effectiveness commitments, relevant to target group's needs.		
	C	Some issues regarding consistency with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid effectiveness or relevance.		
	D	Contradictions with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid efficiency commitments; relevance to needs is questionable. Major adaptations needed.		
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic still holding true?				
	A	Clear and well-structured intervention logic; feasible and consistent vertical logic of objectives; adequate indicators; Risks and Assumptions clearly identified and managed; exit strategy in place (if applicable).		
X	B	Adequate intervention logic although it might need some improvements regarding hierarchy of objectives, indicators, Risk and Assumptions.		
	C	Problems with intervention logic may affect performance of intervention and capacity to monitor and evaluate progress; improvements necessary.		
	D	Intervention logic is faulty and requires major revision for the intervention to have a chance of success.		

2. EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE: Degree to which the resources of the intervention (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been converted into results in an economical way				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least two 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B', no 'C' or 'D' = B; at least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				

Assessment EFFICIENCY : total score		A	B	C	D
		X			
2.1 How well are inputs (financial, HR, goods & equipment) managed?					
X	A	All inputs are available on time and within budget.			
	B	Most inputs are available in reasonable time and do not require substantial budget adjustments. However there is room for improvement.			
	C	Availability and usage of inputs face problems, which need to be addressed; otherwise results may be at risk.			
	D	Availability and management of inputs have serious deficiencies, which threaten the achievement of results. Substantial change is needed.			
2.2 How well is the implementation of activities managed?					
	A	Activities implemented on schedule			
X	B	Most activities are on schedule. Delays exist, but do not harm the delivery of outputs			
	C	Activities are delayed. Corrections are necessary to deliver without too much delay.			
	D	Serious delay. Outputs will not be delivered unless major changes in planning.			
2.3 How well are outputs achieved?					
	A	All outputs have been and most likely will be delivered as scheduled with good quality contributing to outcomes as planned.			
X	B	Output delivery is and will most likely be according to plan, but there is room for improvement in terms of quality, coverage and timing.			
	C	Some output are/will be not delivered on time or with good quality. Adjustments are necessary.			
	D	Quality and delivery of outputs has and most likely will have serious deficiencies. Major adjustments are needed to ensure that at least the key outputs are delivered on time.			

3. EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE: Degree to which the outcome (Specific Objective) is achieved as planned at the end of year N					
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>					
Assessment EFFECTIVENESS : total score		A	B	C	D
		X			
3.1 As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the outcome to be achieved?					
X	A	Full achievement of the outcome is likely in terms of quality and coverage. Negative effects (if any) have been mitigated.			
	B	Outcome will be achieved with minor limitations; negative effects (if any) have not caused much harm.			
	C	Outcome will be achieved only partially among others because of negative effects to which management was not able to fully adapt. Corrective measures have to be taken to improve ability to achieve outcome.			

	D	The intervention will not achieve its outcome unless major, fundamental measures are taken.
3.2 Are activities and outputs adapted (when needed), in order to achieve the outcome?		
X	A	The intervention is successful in adapting its strategies / activities and outputs to changing external conditions in order to achieve the outcome. Risks and assumptions are managed in a proactive manner.
	B	The intervention is relatively successful in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in order to achieve its outcome. Risks management is rather passive.
	C	The intervention has not entirely succeeded in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in a timely or adequate manner. Risk management has been rather static. An important change in strategies is necessary in order to ensure the intervention can achieve its outcome.
	D	The intervention has failed to respond to changing external conditions, risks were insufficiently managed. Major changes are needed to attain the outcome.

4. POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY: The degree of likelihood to maintain and reproduce the benefits of an intervention in the long run (beyond the implementation period of the intervention).				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: At least 3 'A's, no 'C' or 'D' = A; Maximum two 'C's, no 'D' = B; At least three 'C's, no 'D' = C; At least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY : total score	A	B	C	D
				X
4.1 Financial/economic viability?				
	A	Financial/economic sustainability is potentially very good: costs for services and maintenance are covered or affordable; external factors will not change that.		
	B	Financial/economic sustainability is likely to be good, but problems might arise namely from changing external economic factors.		
	C	Problems need to be addressed regarding financial sustainability either in terms of institutional or target groups costs or changing economic context.		
X	D	Financial/economic sustainability is very questionable unless major changes are made.		
4.2 What is the level of ownership of the intervention by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?				
X	A	The steering committee and other relevant local structures are strongly involved in all stages of implementation and are committed to continue producing and using results.		
	B	Implementation is based in a good part on the steering committee and other relevant local structures, which are also somewhat involved in decision-making. Likelihood of sustainability is good, but there is room for improvement.		
	C	The intervention uses mainly ad-hoc arrangements and the steering committee and other relevant local structures to ensure sustainability. Continued results are not guaranteed. Corrective measures are needed.		
	D	The intervention depends completely on ad-hoc structures with no prospect of sustainability. Fundamental changes are needed to enable sustainability.		
4.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between intervention and policy level?				
X	A	Policy and institutions have been highly supportive of intervention and will continue to be so.		

	B	Policy and policy enforcing institutions have been generally supportive, or at least have not hindered the intervention, and are likely to continue to be so.
	C	Intervention sustainability is limited due to lack of policy support. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	Policies have been and likely will be in contradiction with the intervention. Fundamental changes needed to make intervention sustainable.
4.4 How well is the intervention contributing to institutional and management capacity?		
	A	Intervention is embedded in institutional structures and has contributed to improve the institutional and management capacity (even if this is not an explicit goal).
X	B	Intervention management is well embedded in institutional structures and has somewhat contributed to capacity building. Additional expertise might be required. Improvements in order to guarantee sustainability are possible.
	C	Intervention relies too much on ad-hoc structures instead of institutions; capacity building has not been sufficient to fully ensure sustainability. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	Intervention is relying on ad hoc and capacity transfer to existing institutions, which could guarantee sustainability, is unlikely unless fundamental changes are undertaken.

Assessment of CICA

1. RELEVANCE: The degree to which the intervention is in line with local and national policies and priorities as well as with the expectations of the beneficiaries				
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D</i>				
Assessment RELEVANCE: total score	A	B	C	D
	X			
1.1 What is the present level of relevance of the intervention?				
X	A	Clearly still embedded in national policies and Belgian strategy, responds to aid effectiveness commitments, highly relevant to needs of target group.		
	B	Still fits well in national policies and Belgian strategy (without always being explicit), reasonably compatible with aid effectiveness commitments, relevant to target group's needs.		
	C	Some issues regarding consistency with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid effectiveness or relevance.		
	D	Contradictions with national policies and Belgian strategy, aid efficiency commitments; relevance to needs is questionable. Major adaptations needed.		
1.2 As presently designed, is the intervention logic still holding true?				
	A	Clear and well-structured intervention logic; feasible and consistent vertical logic of objectives; adequate indicators; Risks and Assumptions clearly identified and managed; exit strategy in place (if applicable).		
X	B	Adequate intervention logic although it might need some improvements regarding hierarchy of objectives, indicators, Risk and Assumptions.		
	C	Problems with intervention logic may affect performance of intervention and capacity to monitor and evaluate progress; improvements necessary.		

D	Intervention logic is faulty and requires major revision for the intervention to have a chance of success.
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2. EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION TO DATE: Degree to which the resources of the intervention (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been converted into results in an economical way

In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least two 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B', no 'C' or 'D' = B; at least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D

Assessment EFFICIENCY : total score	A	B	C	D
	X			

2.1 How well are inputs (financial, HR, goods & equipment) managed?

X A	All inputs are available on time and within budget.
B	Most inputs are available in reasonable time and do not require substantial budget adjustments. However there is room for improvement.
C	Availability and usage of inputs face problems, which need to be addressed; otherwise results may be at risk.
D	Availability and management of inputs have serious deficiencies, which threaten the achievement of results. Substantial change is needed.

2.2 How well is the implementation of activities managed?

A	Activities implemented on schedule
X B	Most activities are on schedule. Delays exist, but do not harm the delivery of outputs
C	Activities are delayed. Corrections are necessary to deliver without too much delay.
D	Serious delay. Outputs will not be delivered unless major changes in planning.

2.3 How well are outputs achieved?

A	All outputs have been and most likely will be delivered as scheduled with good quality contributing to outcomes as planned.
X B	Output delivery is and will most likely be according to plan, but there is room for improvement in terms of quality, coverage and timing.
C	Some output are/will be not delivered on time or with good quality. Adjustments are necessary.
D	Quality and delivery of outputs has and most likely will have serious deficiencies. Major adjustments are needed to ensure that at least the key outputs are delivered on time.

3. EFFECTIVENESS TO DATE: Degree to which the outcome (Specific Objective) is achieved as planned at the end of year N

In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: 'At least one 'A', no 'C' or 'D' = A; Two times 'B' = B; At least one 'C', no 'D' = C; at least one 'D' = D

Assessment EFFECTIVENESS : total score		A	B	C	D
			X		
3.1 As presently implemented what is the likelihood of the outcome to be achieved?					
	A	Full achievement of the outcome is likely in terms of quality and coverage. Negative effects (if any) have been mitigated.			
X	B	Outcome will be achieved with minor limitations; negative effects (if any) have not caused much harm.			
	C	Outcome will be achieved only partially among others because of negative effects to which management was not able to fully adapt. Corrective measures have to be taken to improve ability to achieve outcome.			
	D	The intervention will not achieve its outcome unless major, fundamental measures are taken.			
3.2 Are activities and outputs adapted (when needed), in order to achieve the outcome?					
	A	The intervention is successful in adapting its strategies / activities and outputs to changing external conditions in order to achieve the outcome. Risks and assumptions are managed in a proactive manner.			
X	B	The intervention is relatively successful in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in order to achieve its outcome. Risks management is rather passive.			
	C	The intervention has not entirely succeeded in adapting its strategies to changing external conditions in a timely or adequate manner. Risk management has been rather static. An important change in strategies is necessary in order to ensure the intervention can achieve its outcome.			
	D	The intervention has failed to respond to changing external conditions, risks were insufficiently managed. Major changes are needed to attain the outcome.			

4. POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY: The degree of likelihood to maintain and reproduce the benefits of an intervention in the long run (beyond the implementation period of the intervention).					
<i>In order to calculate the total score for this quality criterion, proceed as follows: At least 3 'A's, no 'C' or 'D' = A ; Maximum two 'C's, no 'D' = B ; At least three 'C's, no 'D' = C ; At least one 'D' = D</i>					
Assessment POTENTIAL SUSTAINABILITY : total score		A	B	C	D
			X		
4.1 Financial/economic viability?					
	A	Financial/economic sustainability is potentially very good: costs for services and maintenance are covered or affordable; external factors will not change that.			
	B	Financial/economic sustainability is likely to be good, but problems might arise namely from changing external economic factors.			
X	C	Problems need to be addressed regarding financial sustainability either in terms of institutional or target groups costs or changing economic context.			
	D	Financial/economic sustainability is very questionable unless major changes are made.			
4.2 What is the level of ownership of the intervention by target groups and will it continue after the end of external support?					

	A	The steering committee and other relevant local structures are strongly involved in all stages of implementation and are committed to continue producing and using results.
X	B	Implementation is based in a good part on the steering committee and other relevant local structures, which are also somewhat involved in decision-making. Likelihood of sustainability is good, but there is room for improvement.
	C	The intervention uses mainly ad-hoc arrangements and the steering committee and other relevant local structures to ensure sustainability. Continued results are not guaranteed. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	The intervention depends completely on ad-hoc structures with no prospect of sustainability. Fundamental changes are needed to enable sustainability.
4.3 What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between intervention and policy level?		
	A	Policy and institutions have been highly supportive of intervention and will continue to be so.
X	B	Policy and policy enforcing institutions have been generally supportive, or at least have not hindered the intervention, and are likely to continue to be so.
	C	Intervention sustainability is limited due to lack of policy support. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	Policies have been and likely will be in contradiction with the intervention. Fundamental changes needed to make intervention sustainable.
4.4 How well is the intervention contributing to institutional and management capacity?		
	A	Intervention is embedded in institutional structures and has contributed to improve the institutional and management capacity (even if this is not an explicit goal).
X	B	Intervention management is well embedded in institutional structures and has somewhat contributed to capacity building. Additional expertise might be required. Improvements in order to guarantee sustainability are possible.
	C	Intervention relies too much on ad-hoc structures instead of institutions; capacity building has not been sufficient to fully ensure sustainability. Corrective measures are needed.
	D	Intervention is relying on ad hoc and capacity transfer to existing institutions, which could guarantee sustainability, is unlikely unless fundamental changes are undertaken.

4.2 Decisions taken by the steering committee and follow-up

Decision to take	Period of identification	Source	responsible	Progress	Status
<p>The SC takes note of the integration of the FFS in Twigire. The SC approves the creation of new FFS groups as of the season 2015B and approves the following regarding payment of facilitator fees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The FFS facilitators will be paid the previously agreed facilitation fee of 5,000 Rwf/day until 31 July 2014 - The FFS facilitators will receive a monthly facilitation fee of 20,000 Rwf in season 2015B (February to June 2015) for working once a week with 2 new FFS groups (seasonal crops) or once every two weeks with 4 new groups (perennial crops). The FFS facilitators will also receive an additional transport allowance based on the distance from their home to their new groups. 	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program		Ongoing
<p>The SC takes note that existing FFS groups were encouraged to pay for a FFS facilitator to work on a 2nd crop in season 2015A. The payment modality (in cash or kind, timing, the amount etc) are all to be agreed upon between the group and the FFS facilitator. The SC urges RAB and the program to follow closely and to conduct a solid capitalization exercises in order to learn more about the willingness of farmers to pay for advisory services.</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	RAB/ Program		Ongoing
<p>The SC approves the organization of a mass graduation event for FFS facilitators where all facilitators will be grouped in one location before end of calendar year 2014. This event creates the opportunity for the GoR to show their appreciation for the work the FFS facilitators have done as well as the opportunity to motivate all FFS facilitators to continue to deliver for the development of Rwanda. Furthermore, the event will be used to provide essential information regarding (1) the integration of FFS in Twigire and</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	RAB/Program	Decision made by MINAGRI (and MINALOC) of not holding 1 graduation event – but in zones or in	Closed

<p>the exact role of FFS facilitator within the model (2) modalities for the creation of new FFS groups from 15B, (3) the creation of FFS facilitators cooperatives, (4) the TEXT IT sms communication system, (5) noz ubz extension website etc. The SC urges RAB and the program to start immediately with preparation of this event.</p>		<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>Program / RAB</p>	<p>No possibility to work with the identified entity – it does not have a contract with MINAGRI only a Memorandum of Understanding. Proposition for making the assessment internally will be made next SMCL</p>	<p>Closed</p>
<p>The SC agrees to conduct an assessment of the 2500 FFS facilitators (inspection of FFS plot and satisfaction survey with FFS group members). The SC agrees that the program and RAB will explore the possibility to work with the local NGO Moucecore through the framework contract the organization has with RAB/MINAGRI. In case this is not possible, an alternative solution to work with locally based enumerators, in line with Rwandan public procurement Law will be used.</p>		<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>		<p>Working group in place – SSPATI part of it – Plan developed</p>	<p>Closed</p>
<p>RAB commits to submit a proposal to SSPAT2 to explain what is expected from SSPAT2 within the Twigire model. The SC takes note of the plan of RAB to set up a Twigire working group at RAB level to coordinate the technical support of RAB within the Twigire model and to appoint a Twigire coordinator in RAB. The different organizations that support RAB in implementing Twigire will be represented in the working group. The SSPAT program commit to take active part in the working group and to assist RAB in making a comprehensive plan to practically implement RAB's role within Twigire.</p>		<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>Program</p>	<p>Consultant hired for developing the DB (Jan 2015)</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>
<p>The SC approves to start with post control plots as this is the backbone of the whole quality control system, starting from season 15A.</p>		<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>RAB</p>	<p>Control plots in place since Oct</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>

	<p>The SC approves that SSPAT2 support the informal seed production, financed under the seed component. The SC agrees that 100,000 EUR will be allocated for supporting this activity.</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program / RAB	met Positive selection in Potato started oct 14 – Support for cassava mother gardens also started	Ongoing
<p>The SC approves to increase the budget for public seed production with an additional 137, 000 euro under the following conditions: The budget only becomes available in a amount equal to the proven revenue from sales of basic seed from the current or future seed stock ((sales occurred after the 1st of Sept 2014, basic seed sold at regular price, booked on the seed revolving fund account properly evidenced) The budget only become available if the missing report about seed production in 2013B and 2014B are provided by RAB to the SSPAT2 management. These reports must allow the program to trace seed used as input, outputs of production, stocks, sales and revenues.</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program / RAB		Budget increased but reports to be provided by RAB still not provided – RAB currently not eligible for the additional budget	
<p>The SC also approves to reserve an additional 100,000 euro for the operational costs of potato plantlet and mini tuber production.</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	RAB		The amount has been allocated – but till now no activity planned by RAB	
<p>The SC takes record that the estimated available funds will probably be insufficient to finance the public seed production in 2015B. The SC agrees that SSPAT2 will not increase the extra budget for public seed production beyond the 137,000 euro added in September 2014. MINAGRI and RAB commit to search an alternative source of funds.</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program / RAB		Not informed about alternative source of funds found by GoR	Closed
<p>The SC approves the support that SSPAT2 is providing to MINAGRI/RAB in the fight against MLND. However, the financial commitment is limited to 20,000 Euro. The SSPAT program will also support the fight against cassava; these activities are currently financed under quality control (A0110).</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program / RAB		MLND task force in place and meeting every month for follow up	ongoing
<p>The SC agrees that the specific focus of the BTC Seed expert is to (1) Assist to improve</p>	Sept 2014	SMCL	Program			Closed

<p>the seed production planning (however final plan is made by RAB); (2) Assist with improving quality control system; (3) Assist with the comprehensive training program of seed growers and (4) Assist with support to informal seed production. The Seed expert will also assist on specific requests of the management as long as the request is in his line of expertise.</p>	<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>MINAGRI / CICA</p>	<p>Publication in Jan 2015</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>
<p>The SC approves to recruit 3 additional contractual staff for CICA for 1 year. The term of reference will be approved by the PS and non-objection of BTC. The SC urges RAB and to program to give due attention to the crosscutting themes. The SC approves the principle to fully use the power of the FFS facilitators as peer trainers in their community. Therefore, the SC approves the proposal to hire or qualified organizations as master trainers to train the FFS facilitators on Gender and HIV. For Gender, a tender to hire qualified gender master trainers (3 master trainers, of which 1 team leader) specialized in the methodology of positive masculinity will be launched. These gender master trainers will train and coach 300 FFS Facilitators & RAB Master Trainers during several months. The total amount of farmers reached will be 15,000. For HIV, the program will try to link up with existing initiatives who could provide the master trainers free of charge. If needed, a tender will also be launched. A total of 50 FFS facilitators will be trained. They will organize half day awareness raising sessions for 1000 FFS groups, reaching 25,000 farmers in total. TOR to be validated by appropriate line ministries.</p>	<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>Program</p>	<p>Gender: Eol launched (Jan 2015) HIV: contact taken with Biomedical Center (Public entity) – discussion undergoing</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>
<p>MINAGRI and RAB commit to share the final structure of the SPU MINAGRI and SPU RAB with the program and BTC as soon as it is officially available and commit to submit a proposal on staff to be supported by SSPAT2 to the program and BTC for non-objection.</p>	<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>MINAGRI / RAB</p>	<p>Nothing received</p>	<p></p>
<p>The SC agrees that all unaccounted budget spent by RAB will be reimbursed to the program if proper reporting is not submitted by the 31 Dec 2014.</p>	<p>Sept 2014</p>	<p>SMCL</p>	<p>RAB</p>	<p>Only 2 incomplete reports received by 15th of Jan 2015</p>	<p></p>

4.3 Updated Logical framework

No update of the logical framework.

4.4 MoRe Results at a glance

Logical framework's results or indicators modified in last 12 months?	No
Baseline Report registered on PIT?	2012
Planning MTR (registration of report)	05/2014
Planning ETR (registration of report)	01/2016
Backstopping missions since 01/01/2012	1

4.5 “Budget versus current (y – m)” Report

Provide “Budget versus current (y – m)” Report (this can be annexed to this document and doesn't have to be included in the report as such.)